The Role of Industrial Policy: Lessons from Asia by Khan, Mushtaq
Chapter 5 
The Role of Industrial Policy:  
Lessons from Asia 
Mushtaq Khan 
5.1 Introduction 
In the second half of the twentieth century, a number of Asian countries achieved 
significant growth accelerations and began to rapidly catch up with advanced 
countries. Their success was based on their vigorous participation and competition in 
global markets, but it is now widely recognized that they were so successful in 
developing their competitiveness because of equally vigorous state support and 
industrial policies. Their experience demonstrated that competitiveness was not 
always exogenously determined by ‘comparative advantage’. Competitiveness could 
be developed and changed by deliberate policies, though obviously within limits set 
by what could feasibly be achieved given the initial conditions of different countries. 
While these successful Asian countries were rapidly industrializing, the emergence of 
a new market fundamentalism in advanced countries, and particularly in the UK and 
the US, led to an unconditional acceptance of an accelerated de-industrialization in 
these countries as a normal consequence of changing comparative advantage. Over 
the longer term, the important lesson from the East Asian success stories is surely that 
comparative advantage is not a ‘given’ and policy can influence comparative 
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advantage within broad limits. The policy question facing Britain is whether de-
industrialization has proceeded too far and what if anything can be done about it. 
 
The Asian experience is important for a number of reasons beyond establishing 
the importance of industrial policies. The Asian experience also shows that industrial 
policy was not uniformly successful. Many countries, including those in the Indian 
subcontinent, achieved much poorer results with their industrial policies in the 1960s 
and 1970s. These countries ended up protecting and subsidizing many infant 
industries that refused to become competitive despite decades of support. However, 
South Asia went through a realignment of its industrial policies in the 1980s and 
achieved much greater success as a result, with some of their most important 
competitive sectors emerging through new versions of industrial policies in a number 
of these countries. While Asian countries are still far away from European ones in 
terms of their levels of development, and therefore in the types of industrial policy 
challenges that they face, there are a number of general lessons from some of the 
diverse Asian experiences that could be relevant for policy discussions in the UK. 
 
For an advanced country like the UK, industrial policy clearly has to support both 
innovation and the development of competitive production capabilities that can 
convert ideas and knowledge into marketable products. There is no question therefore 
that industrial policy must have a focus on supporting innovation and the development 
of new knowledge. This involves investment in public bodies such as universities as 
well as in networks linking public and private players engaged in innovation. 
Countries such as the UK still have a lead over most emerging Asian countries in the 
organization of innovation, though there may be particular strategies of financing or 
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organizing innovation that may be worth looking at. However, the second plank of 
any effective industrial policy has to be the development of competitive 
manufacturing capabilities so that good ideas and technologies can be converted into 
competitive products. Here the UK can learn a lot about the types of problems 
countries can face when they try to acquire (or, in the case of the UK, reacquire) firm-
level competitive capabilities. Britain’s gradual loss of manufacturing 
competitiveness after the Second World War was exacerbated after the 1980s in the 
context of its rapid de-industrialization. The country lost much of the tacit knowledge 
embedded in the organizational routines of manufacturing firms, and as a result fell 
even further behind in terms of its capacity to regain a broad base of competitive 
firms. The experience of Asian industrial policy shows that the achievement of 
competitiveness in new sectors and technologies can be a difficult problem to crack. 
The two planks of industrial policy are closely connected because without a broad 
base of firms that can organize production competitively, a successful innovation 
strategy will simply result in the offshoring of manufacturing somewhere else. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 outlines a number of 
different dimensions of the industrial policy debate using the Asian experience as the 
backdrop. Industrial policies face a dual challenge: they have to identify and target the 
most important constraints facing a particular country, and they also have to address 
these problems in ways that can be implemented and enforced in the contexts of 
particular political and institutional contexts. The experience of success and failure in 
Asia shows the importance of designing policy so that it satisfies both these 
requirements. The implication of the second requirement in particular is that industrial 
policies have a high degree of country specificity and instruments that have been 
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effective in one context will not necessarily work in others. Section 5.3 outlines the 
range of different contracting failures that can constrain the emergence of a broad-
based and competitive manufacturing sector. There are obviously a number of 
different theoretically plausible problems that can constrain the emergence of a 
diversified and competitive industrial sector. However, the most fundamental 
requirement of success is that emerging firms can acquire the organizational and 
technological capabilities to become competitive. If this problem is not effectively 
addressed, solving other constraints blocking the emergence of competitive firms is 
unlikely to deliver sustainable results. While the absence of a sufficient base of firm-
level organizational capabilities used to be a problem primarily affecting developing 
countries, this is now just as likely to be a major constraint in advanced countries that 
have experienced rapid de-industrialization. Finally, Section 5.4 outlines the problem 
of designing policy solutions that are consistent with the enforcement capacities of the 
state, which in turn depends on national institutions and politics operating within the 
confines of global rules and power structures. It is therefore not only important to 
identify the relevant contracting failures and constraints correctly, it is equally 
important to design responses to these problems that will work given local 
implementation and enforcement capabilities. The comparative Asian experience 
shows that industrial policies can fail for either reason. An appropriate methodology 
of policy analysis can reduce the dangers of mistakes in policy design but a viable 
industrial policy strategy should also be ‘experimentalist’, so that different policy 
instruments can be trialled and policies redesigned and reformed in the light of 
experience. This too is an important lesson from the Asian experience. 
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5.2 Dimensions of Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy in the broadest sense describes policies that aim to support the 
development and adoption of technologies and capabilities that raise social 
productivity. Industrial policies (or technology policies as they are sometimes referred 
to) are required when private contracting fails to organize potentially gainful 
investments that achieve these outcomes. The problems that could prevent 
organizations independently contracting to arrange these investments are variants of 
contracting failures that emerge because of high transacting and contracting costs. The 
most important variants of contracting problems that industrial policies have to 
address will be discussed briefly later. It is conceptually possible to distinguish 
investments in innovation that result in the generation of new technologies and 
products from investments in firm-level capability development that enable these 
technologies to be used to produce competitive products. The distinction can often be 
difficult to make in practice as firms are often simultaneously engaged in innovating 
and changing their production processes and internal management systems. But the 
conceptual distinction is easy to see when a country or a firm is attempting to 
competitively produce a product that is already being produced by some other firm. 
The latter is not necessarily an easier problem to solve; indeed it is probably the 
bigger challenge for an economy such as the UK as it attempts to re-enter the 
processes of manufacturing to a significant extent. 
 
Industrial policy defined in this way is not necessarily restricted to the promotion 
of the industrial sector alone, though some proponents of industrial policy do indeed 
interpret it in the narrower sense on the grounds that technological progress and social 
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productivity are likely to rise faster if the industrial sector is prioritized (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 2006). In this chapter, industrial policy will be used in the broader sense 
to refer to technology policies generally, though the examples of applications that we 
look at primarily involve manufacturing. Industrial policies can be ‘horizontal’, if 
they seek to improve the general efficiency of markets and the provision of broadly 
defined public goods to facilitate greater private investment in innovation and 
capability development. Industrial policy can also be ‘vertical’ or targeted if it focuses 
on solving particular contracting failures affecting investments relevant for particular 
sectors or technologies (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009). There is greater political and 
policy resistance to targeted policies because they are seen as discriminatory as well 
as involving judgements about ‘picking winners’. In fact, the distinction between the 
two types of policies is not very sharp, and the real distinction is about effectiveness 
and relevance for solving particular problems. 
 
In reality, policies always discriminate between individuals, sectors, or firms in 
some way or another. For instance, apparently non-discriminatory policies may be 
discriminatory in reality if firms or sectors face very different constraints, and 
horizontal policy ignores these differences. A policy that fails to recognize differences 
in the types and intensities of problems across sectors effectively discriminates 
against sectors with more severe problems. Conversely, policy that does identify 
priorities across sectors, regions, and so on, and then sequentially addresses them, 
may help to create a more level playing field over time. Obviously not all problems, 
whether they are general or particular, can be feasibly addressed by policy. The real 
question is whether the priorities identified by the policy are politically acceptable and 
whether the policy is effective in the sense of achieving the outcomes that are desired. 
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It is true that highly targeted policy responses that create rents and opportunities for a 
relatively small number of firms can be more susceptible to capture by sectional 
interests. Policy design has to ensure that the policy does not end up protecting 
uncompetitive activities and monopolistic privileges. That would indeed be a 
discriminatory outcome. The way to avoid such outcomes is through better policy 
design, and by avoiding policies that are more susceptible to this danger. The relevant 
point is that we do not necessarily achieve better outcomes by always selecting 
‘horizontal’ policies that appear not to be targeting specific problems or sectors. The 
most neutral policies in these terms may sustain a very undesirable status quo. 
 
The Asian experience suggests that the choice between horizontal and vertical 
industrial policies should be interpreted differently. Clearly some policies are more 
horizontal in the distribution of benefits across firms and sectors and others are more 
targeted. Truly horizontal policies that do not discriminate between firms and sectors 
in any way are unlikely to exist, and highly targeted strategies that benefit a very few 
firms are very likely to be captured and may in any case be strongly opposed by other 
interests in society. The relevant choices are always likely to be between policies 
located in the middle of the horizontal–vertical spectrum. When we look at this range, 
there are no compelling theoretical reasons why policies that are somewhat more 
horizontal will necessarily perform better in terms of social objectives. The Asian 
experience supports this expectation because the most successful high-impact 
strategies generally targeted specific technologies, regions, and contracting problems 
that were inevitably of greater interest and benefit to some sectors and firms in the 
first instance. These policies ranged from the sectorally targeted industrial policy 
instruments of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, to the region-specific 
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incentives and provincial competition in China in the 1980s and beyond (Wade, 1988; 
Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; World Bank, 1993; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Qian, 
2003). The distinguishing characteristic of more successful policies was that they 
identified and targeted the most important problems, and the policy solutions were 
implementable and enforceable in particular political and institutional contexts. 
 
The last sentence describes a combination of characteristics that is often not 
properly understood by policy-makers. Moreover, many widely shared interpretations 
of what is required for a successful industrial policy are actually misleading. An 
example is the common perception both amongst supporters and opponents of 
industrial policies that success requires a state with the vision and the capacity for 
‘picking winners’. This metaphor is very unfortunate because it implies that 
successful industrial policy countries had wise bureaucrats whose vision of the future 
was particularly prescient. The implication is that if bureaucrats and politicians 
display few signs of such innate abilities, industrial policies of the Asian type are best 
avoided. The reality in Asia was very different. East Asian countries did not initially 
differ from South Asian ones (in the 1950s and 1960s) in the quality let alone the 
prescience of their bureaucrats. The difference was rather that the policy instruments 
that emerged in East Asia could be enforced or altered in their political contexts. But 
the South Asian industrial policy instruments, though they were very similar to the 
East Asian ones, were rapidly captured by powerful interests. With the benefit of 
hindsight, these instruments were inappropriate for the South Asian political 
settlements. The initial policy instruments emerged rather serendipitously in all these 
countries, but in East Asia the instruments created benefit streams (or rents) that could 
be effectively monitored and withdrawn, and their conditions of allocation changed in 
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the light of the results achieved. In South Asia the same rents could not be easily 
withdrawn or altered once they had been introduced. This was not at all a 
characteristic of the quality or capacities of the state but rather of the configuration of 
power between state agencies and rent-receiving firms given the types of rents that 
these policies created. What emerges as important is the ‘fit’ of particular policies 
within particular ‘political settlements’, defined as the distribution of organizational 
power in a society, which determined whether appropriate conditions could be defined 
and enforced for these policies. 
 
The ability or otherwise of particular bureaucrats or politicians to pick the right 
winners ex ante obfuscates these issues. In fact, East Asian industrial policies 
frequently targeted the wrong firms and sectors to begin with. The difference was that 
mistakes were quickly corrected and policy design and sectoral choices evolved 
rapidly in the light of experience. Far from any mysterious capacity of some policy-
makers to pick winners ex ante, industrial policy was successful here because the fit 
between initial policy design and the political and institutional conditions of the 
country allowed incremental policy evolution through the correction of mistakes. In 
contrast, in less successful countries such as those in South Asia, the initial policy 
design was inappropriate given the political settlement, and benefits were created for 
powerful organizations which had the ability to capture and protect their policy-
induced rents regardless of performance. The result was policy stagnation and the 
failure to correct mistakes years or decades after it had become obvious to everyone 
that the wrong firms or sectors had been ‘picked’. The difference in outcomes had 
almost nothing to do with any capacity for ‘picking winners’ and a lot more to do with 
the complex mix of policy, institutional, and political characteristics that added up to 
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a capacity for ‘dropping losers’. But even this phrase can be misleading because it 
does not capture the complex set of conditions we want to highlight. The 
interdependence of policy design, political settlements, and implementation success is 
unfortunately not widely understood, even within Asian countries with their different 
experiences with industrial policy. 
 
The implementation issue is at the heart of industrial policy success or failure. 
But it is obviously not the only factor determining the success of industrial policy. 
The significance of the implementation and enforcement issues can be better 
understood by separating them from other types of problems. First, industrial policies 
can fail simply because policy-makers have multiple objectives and are attempting to 
achieve too many goals with a limited set of instruments. For instance, a policy that 
aims to achieve productivity growth can be diluted and distorted if policy-makers also 
want to protect employment in the firms and sectors being targeted. Multiple 
objectives require packages of policies targeting different problems because of these 
types of trade-offs. 
 
A second and more important problem emerges when a policy targets a discrete 
problem but the diagnosis of the problem is wrong. Many different types of 
contracting failures can constrain investments in innovation and learning, and policies 
that may have been appropriate if the problem was due to one set of problems may be 
insufficient or inappropriate if the real problem was something else. For instance, 
policies relevant for solving a problem of insufficient investments in skills may be 
irrelevant and wasteful in a context where the main problem was that firms lacked the 
organizational capability to achieve competitiveness. To make matters worse, if low 
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capability firms are surveyed, their managers are very likely to attribute their low 
competitiveness to poor worker skills or other constraints. But if low organizational 
capabilities were the more important problem, an expenditure of public resources in 
skills training may end up creating an additional problem of unemployed skilled 
labour on top of the already existing problem of uncompetitive firms. Policy-makers 
clearly need to have a careful analysis of the causes of low competitiveness, low 
investment or whatever the proximate problem appears to be, because superficial 
assessments and survey evidence may be misleading. 
 
Finally, industrial policies can also fail even if the problems have been correctly 
identified because the particular instruments chosen to address these turn out to be 
ineffective in that political and social context. This problem has resulted in many 
failures in Asian industrial policy. A society always has a specific economic and 
political structure that can be described by the capabilities and the distribution of 
power across different types of organizations. The relative bargaining power of 
different types of firms, government agencies, and other stakeholders can vary greatly 
across countries given their initial conditions. We describe this distribution of 
organizational power as the political settlement within the country (Khan, 1995, 
2010). Features of the political settlement matter for the enforcement of industrial 
policy because the latter typically provides explicit or implicit policy support (rents) 
to particular firms or sectors conditional on the achievement of desired outcomes. The 
results of industrial policy (or indeed of any policy in general) depends critically on 
how effectively the state can monitor the outcome that is desired, and change the 
allocation and terms of support in the light of emerging results. The historical 
evidence shows that the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement depends only 
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partly on the technical and bureaucratic capabilities of state agencies and quite a bit 
on the political settlement defining the relative bargaining power of the different types 
of organizations receiving and managing these rents. 
 
When policy-induced rents are captured without delivering results, the outcome is 
often referred to as a government or state failure. Conservative political economists 
have argued that intervention should in general be avoided because the costs of 
government failure are very often more significant than those of the market failures 
the policy attempted to address (Krueger, 1990). This debate is important because the 
causes of success or failure are usually not properly understood. The defeatism of 
conservative political economists is often countered by a ‘possibilistic’ progressive 
optimism based on an equally selective choice of examples. But just as conservative 
pessimism cannot explain the successes that were sometimes achieved through 
industrial policy, the optimism of progressives does not explain why there were 
frequent failures, and what needs to be done to avoid more failures in the future. The 
possibility of failure certainly does not imply that non-intervention or horizontal 
policies are the best response. Rather, the evidence from Asia shows that policy 
design that improves the compatibility of the policy’s enforcement requirements with 
the enforcement conditions possible under the prevailing political settlement can 
significantly reduce the chances of failure. 
 
The challenge for policy-makers at the design stage is that they have to be able to 
imagine whether a particular policy, with feasible improvements in governance 
capabilities, can be well enough enforced in the existing political settlement to yield 
useful results. It is at this stage that an analysis of the policy-induced incentives and 
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compulsions facing different types of actors and their likely responses given their 
bargaining power can help to reduce the chances of a failure in policy design. 
Analysis of the likely contracting failures that are constraining policy and of 
international experiences in different contexts can contribute to this policy discussion. 
This thought process does not guarantee success, but it can reduce the chances of 
failure. The final component of the policy process is therefore an explicit commitment 
to experimentation. Here too, policy design is relevant, so that policies are constructed 
keeping in mind that they may need to be reversed or modified as evidence about 
outcomes comes in. 
5.3 The Fundamental Constraint of Organizational 
Capabilities 
One of the long-term effects of the rapid de-industrialization in advanced countries 
has been the loss of organizational capabilities as manufacturing firms were shut 
down. Their internal routines and the knowledge of how to organize production on 
which their competitiveness had been based in the past were in many cases entirely 
lost. This was an important contributor to the long-term hysteresis of the 
manufacturing sector in many advanced countries. As wages and exchange rates 
continue to rise in China, it may become increasingly viable to bring some outsourced 
manufacturing back to the UK. But the loss of firms with productive organizational 
capabilities means that this shift in production is no longer likely to happen without 
policy support, even in sectors that could be potentially competitive. The ‘knowledge’ 
on which firm competitiveness is based includes the internal routines and systems that 
sustain high levels of productivity, high standards in quality control, efficiency in 
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inventory management, low levels of input wastage and downtime, and so on. This is 
largely tacit knowledge that is essential for achieving competitiveness, and is often 
embedded in the routines of how things are done by different members of a complex 
team. The requisite tacit knowledge can be ‘learnt’ through a process of learning-by-
doing, but the investments that enable learning-by-doing are also subject to significant 
contracting failures. This is therefore an important area of concern for industrial 
policy strategies. 
 
Given the missing capabilities in manufacturing, it would be insufficient for an 
industrial policy programme in Britain just to support innovation. Industrial policy 
does of course have an important role in supporting innovation and that is well 
understood. There is a large literature, for instance, on the role of patent policy and 
the direct public funding of research. These policies create technology rents and their 
effectiveness raises issues such as the management of the length of protection and the 
conditions attached to patents, the institutional organization of the public funding of 
research, the structure of public-private networks, the competitiveness of the markets 
in which innovating firms operate, and so on (Dosi, 1988; Pelikan, 1988; Stiglitz, 
1995; Khan, 2000a; Aghion et al., 2002; Stiglitz, 2007). As the importance of 
innovation is not in question in an advanced country, and as the Asian experience is 
more useful for understanding the second plank of industrial policy, we will focus on 
the policy support required to develop a broad base of competitive firms. Domestic 
innovation would be much more likely to translate into domestic production if many 
competitive firms already existed in the UK manufacturing sector. Otherwise, 
innovation would most likely find its way to production in some other country. Here 
there are important lessons to learn from the Asian experience of developing firm-
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level competitiveness. In the rest of this section we will discuss the important 
contracting failures that can affect the development of competitiveness and the policy 
responses that are called for. This will take us to the next section where we discuss the 
problem of effectiveness of enforcement and implementation, which depends on the 
interface of policy solutions with the political settlement. 
 
The common feature of all policies addressing contracting failures is that they 
create different types of rents for the supported firms and organizations. However, an 
accurate diagnosis of the underlying problem is important otherwise support may be 
provided for the wrong problem. Since production is normally carried out by 
organized groups of people, the capacity to organize a production team in an effective 
and efficient way is a necessary condition for the success of any productive enterprise. 
If there are contracting failures preventing the development of these missing 
organizational capabilities, then policies that only solve other problems are not likely 
to help the emergence of a productive sector. The empirical evidence shows that 
policy-induced rents can support learning-by-doing but only if very specific 
conditions are set for rent recipients to induce high levels of effort in experimentation 
and learning. Not surprisingly, policies that simply provide rents to firms facing a 
variety of contracting failures rarely achieve good results. In many cases, 
unconditional rent allocation to ‘infant industries’ can simply create perverse 
incentives and incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities to protect these rents. 
Thus, in the typical case where multiple problems exist, policy has to address each 
separately, but in most cases, the problem of missing organizational capabilities is the 




The contracting problems that can constrain the development of firm-level 
competitiveness can include externality problems affecting investments in improving 
workforce skills, externalities facing first-mover investors in sectors that may or may 
not turn out to be competitive, a variety of coordination problems affecting 
investments across interdependent sectors, and, most importantly for us, the principal-
agent problems facing investors investing in learning-by-doing processes (Khan, 
2013a). If private contracting fails to find appropriate solutions to these and other 
problems, policy interventions are required. But policy is only likely to be effective if 
it targets the most relevant problem. 
 
Developing countries have used a variety of instruments to address this mix of 
problems, but very often the design of the instruments was not differentiated enough 
to identify the most appropriate conditions to impose on supported sectors to ensure 
that particular problems were addressed. The rents created were usually broadly 
defined with loose conditions, and it is not surprising that in many cases the results 
achieved were not very dramatic. Results were only dramatic in contexts where the 
power relationships between rent-creating agencies and the rent-receiving firms 
allowed an evolution of the conditions attached to rents in the light of the results 
achieved. When this happened, policy rapidly evolved to define conditions for rent 
allocation that solved particular problems, and in these cases there were often very 
dramatic results. The challenge is to understand the mix of conditions that created 
these good results so that what happened serendipitously and over relatively long 
periods in a few countries can inform deliberate policy design more generally. The 
early instruments of industrial policy often created rents for targeted firms without too 
many conditions or with conditions that were not very carefully thought through. 
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Rent-creating policy instruments included the protection of domestic markets for 
infant industries, subsidizing technology acquisition through implicit or explicit 
subsidies such as low interest credit, and export subsidies and tax breaks for investing 
in new machinery. Each of these instruments provided rents which could in principle 
have addressed specific contracting failures but only if the rents were granted with the 
right performance conditions. 
 
For instance, positive externalities can constrain investments in training because 
investors may fear a loss of their investment if trained workers leave to work in other 
firms or sectors. One policy response to positive externality problems is to reduce the 
risk and cost for firms investing in training by providing subsidies for these firms or 
to the workers undergoing training. But clearly, the subsidy would be insufficient on 
its own in many cases without arrangements for monitoring the content and quality of 
the training achieved. So the terms of the rent allocation would have to include 
credible withdrawal and penalty arrangements and the monitoring of training quality 
(Dosi, 1988; Khan, 2000a). In the same way, the externality problem associated with 
first-mover investments can also be dealt with using a subsidy, but now very different 
conditions need to be identified and enforced. The problem here refers to the 
possibility that the first investors in a sector have additional costs that later investors 
can free-ride on. An example is the possibility discussed by Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2003) that first movers may have to invest a lot in discovering areas in which a 
country has comparative advantage. As first movers may fail to capture sufficient 
returns on their investments, for instance because subsequent entry into the sector can 
reduce their profits by raising wages and input prices, investments in discovery and 
other first-mover investments may be constrained. Unlike new innovations, discovery 
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cannot be patented, and therefore the solution to this contracting failure may require 
temporary subsidies that encourage trials in new sectors. These rents need their own 
set of effective conditions: they have to be available for short periods, they should 
only be given for investments in ‘new’ sectors, and for no longer than is needed to set 
up the trials and discover the presence or absence of comparative advantage. 
 
Coordination of investments across sectors may be important because of both 
demand and supply side complementarities. High transaction costs, information 
asymmetries, and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by second movers may 
preclude private contracting solutions to solve coordination problems (Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953; Scitovsky, 1954; Williamson, 1985; Murphy et al., 
1989). Government agencies charged with the implementation of coordination 
policies are in a position to provide rents to firms in promoted clusters. But here a 
complex set of conditions has to be enforced to ensure that the desired coordination 
comes about. The identification of the clusters to be supported and the complementary 
investments that private investors have to provide have to be agreed upon, monitored, 
and enforced. Coordination is a part of industrial policy that finds a lot of support 
amongst economists advising governments, largely because writing complex plans 
creates significant job opportunities. However, few countries have made significant 
progress in industrialization because of the quality of their coordinated planning. This 
is largely because the implementation of coordinated national investment plans faces 
significant enforcement problems. There can, however, be payoffs for the proper 
coordination of investments in industrial clusters, but this too requires high levels of 
capacity and the appropriate design of incentives, as the Chinese experience has 
shown. It is at this level that attention on coordination should initially be focused. 
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 But the solutions to all these contracting failures assume that a more fundamental 
contracting failure has been addressed. Many countries find it difficult to absorb and 
use existing technologies even when their wages are low enough compared to their 
competitors and they have sufficient workers with the appropriate formal skills. The 
missing factor is often the organizational capability of the production team. Owners, 
managers, and supervisors often do not know how best to set up the factory, align the 
machinery, set up systems for quality control, reduce input wastage and product 
rejection, manage inventories, match order flows with production cycles, maintain 
after sales services, and approach a host of other internal team coordination and 
management issues that are essential for achieving competitiveness. Differences in 
these capabilities can result in very significant differences in labour, input, and capital 
productivity across countries (Khan, 2009, 2013a). As a result, a firm that is able to 
buy the same machinery as its competitors at international prices, and employ workers 
and managers at the same or lower wages than the most competitive country, may yet 
be unable to achieve competitiveness. This is a problem that developing countries 
face all the time, but is likely to be just as relevant for advanced countries that have 
de-industrialized. 
 
Organizational capabilities of the type that we are discussing can only be learnt to 
a limited extent as codified knowledge or formal knowledge that can potentially be 
provided by training institutes. Organizational capabilities are largely based on tacit 
knowledge that is acquired through learning-by-doing, and moreover, it involves 
experimentation with and restructuring of the organization of a production team. The 
knowledge gained through this learning-by-doing is thus embedded in the routines 
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and practices of the team. To make matters more complicated, the most effective 
organization for the same production process can vary from country to country 
depending on the work patterns and habits of the workforce (Whitley, 1992). Once an 
effective organizational structure emerges for a particular sector in a country, it can be 
copied by other firms, but a new team will also require some time to experiment and 
come up with its own modifications and details to produce similar results. Firm 
organization can vary from firm to firm, but the closer the existing routines of a 
production team are to the routines and processes it is trying to emulate, the faster the 
learning-by-doing is likely to be. By definition, learning-by-doing requires 
opportunities for doing, and this requires periods of loss-financing when the firm is 
engaged in production but is unable to make sufficient or any profits. One of the 
classical justifications for infant industry protection was to allow infants to grow up in 
precisely this sense. However, here too, rents have to be delivered with appropriate 
conditions. Here ‘learning rents’ provide the opportunity for a production team to 
engage in production, but it also has to be under pressure to continuously experiment 
with new internal organizational arrangements to achieve the increases in productivity 
that justify the investment in learning (Khan, 2000a). Thus, the ‘doing’ is necessary 
but does not guarantee ‘learning’, unless there is some compulsion on the owners, 
managers, and supervisors to put in high levels of effort in the learning process (Khan, 
2013a). 
 
In theory, complex contingency contracts between the private parties involved 
could address these investment requirements. Essentially, private investors putting in 
their money in building firm-level competitiveness would need to have credible ways 
of penalizing non-performance and extracting their capital if the project fails. These 
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contracts are difficult to write and enforce, and the returns are not that high if the firm 
is attempting to achieve competitiveness in competitive sectors. The problem is that 
innovative sectors where there are high returns due to technology rents require 
underlying productive capacities that would also have been able to produce 
competitive products competitively. Otherwise, the production of even high rent 
products will migrate to countries where firm-level organizational capabilities are 
higher. A necessary condition for achieving the goal of organizational capability 
development is that conditions of rent allocation and withdrawal have to be clearly set 
out so that owners, managers, supervisors, and others feel the compulsion to put a 
high level of effort into the learning process. This problem usually cannot be solved 
by announcing the time period for support in advance. Unlike a trial that is supposed 
to discover comparative advantage (where reasonable time periods for trials can be 
pre-specified), here comparative advantage is being created through learning and the 
development of organizational capabilities. The creation of comparative advantage 
can take periods of time that differ from country to country, sector to sector, and 
perhaps even firm to firm. More complex monitoring and incentives are required here 
to induce the right kinds of effort. 
 
Why is it necessary to impose conditions on firms to ensure that they put the 
requisite effort into the learning process? It may appear that the rational strategy for 
the leadership of a firm would be to ensure a high learning effort anyway. The prize 
for the firm would be to achieve competitiveness and became self-sustaining. This 
motivation can sometimes work, but the evidence suggests that this can by no means 
be taken for granted. Indeed, there are good reasons why this is not necessarily the 
only rational strategy for key stakeholders in the firm. Learning and experimentation 
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are costly exercises. Internal distributive conflicts have to be managed as hierarchies 
and responsibilities may have to be restructured frequently. In addition, the prize is 
not necessarily very attractive. The firm that puts a lot of effort into raising its 
productivity and achieves competitiveness through organizational learning is 
rewarded by losing its rent and the security that comes with it. In exchange it gains 
the dubious privilege of sinking or swimming in a competitive market. Without some 
degree of compulsion to do otherwise, the rational behaviour of many firm managers 
may well be to ‘satisfice’, in the sense described by Herbert Simon (1956, 1983), and 
put more effort into the political activity that preserves their rents. 
 
Given these examples of very different problems that may constrain 
competitiveness, industrial policies clearly have to be formulated to address specific 
problems and issues. If an industrial policy strategy fails to identify the most 
important problems relevant for the sector or country, strategies of supporting 
emerging firms are likely to fail. In some countries, famously the East Asian ones, 
ambitious technology policies that provided support simultaneously for many firms 
and sectors resulted in accelerated technology acquisition and development. But when 
we look at these examples in detail, it was because very specific and unusual 
configurations of bargaining power allowed the development of policy conditions and 
targets in a pragmatic way. In many other countries, policies with a similar level of 
ambition resulted in the proliferation of subsidies to protected industries that refused 
to grow up. Subsidies kept growing and could not be withdrawn, despite the poor 
performance of the supported firms and sectors. Similarly, in some countries 
development banks played a dynamic role, while in others their low interest loans 
were not repaid and development banks eventually went bankrupt. In these less 
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dynamic cases, consumers and taxpayers often ended up paying the price for these 
failing policies till they were finally abandoned. 
 
The identification of the most relevant contracting failures is therefore the 
necessary first stage of developing effective industrial policy solutions. The second 
stage is to investigate whether a policy with the requisite characteristics can be 
enforced given the configuration of power and capabilities across the organizations 
affected by the policy. Policy responses that worked in one country may not be 
implementable in another. On the other hand, there are typically multiple solutions to 
the same problem, and each solution implies a different allocation of rents and a 
somewhat different set of conditions for achieving desirable outcomes. This makes it 
more likely that effective solutions can be found despite differences in political 
settlements, as long as the relevant features of the political settlement are understood. 
5.4 The Political Economy of Rent Management 
There are in principle many ways in which a particular contracting failure can be 
addressed. Each solution involves different distributions of costs and benefits and 
requires different sets of conditions to be enforced on different organizations. Given 
the relative power and capability of different types of organizations in that society, 
some solutions may be more feasible to implement than others. Some theoretically 
feasible solutions may not be feasible in practice if their implementation requires the 
enforcement of conditions on very powerful or well-connected organizations. The 
attempt to enforce these policies may then result in ‘government failures’ as the 
policy gets distorted by the rent-seeking activities of powerful organizations. This 
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does not necessarily mean that this contracting problem cannot or should not be 
addressed. A different approach addressing the problem using different instruments or 
targeting different types of firms and technologies may enjoy greater success. 
Paradoxically, a second-best strategy that starts by assisting smaller firms or firms 
using less-developed technologies may be better in developing organizational 
capabilities or solving other contracting problems in political settlements where the 
bargaining power of the best firms is likely to result in unconditional rent capture. The 
political economy of enforcing a policy thus depends on three factors. First, it 
depends on the design of the policy that determines who gets the rents and the 
conditions that need to be imposed on the rent recipients to address the particular 
problem. Second, the outcome depends on the governance, monitoring, and 
enforcement capacities of the government agencies involved in monitoring the policy 
and its conditions. And last but not least, the outcome depends on the political 
settlement that describes the relative bargaining power of the different organizations 
affected by the policy. Clearly, the design of any policy is less likely to be wrong if it 
explicitly identifies the rent allocation conditions required to solve the problem in the 
different variants of policy design that are possible, and then selects the variant that is 
most likely to be implemented given the existing political settlement and feasible 
improvements in governance capacities. 
 
The relevance of policy design can be illustrated with reference to the somewhat 
simpler contracting failures that can result in environmental externalities. Policy can 
respond to an externality problem using different instruments, including regulation, 
taxation, or subsidization. If we ignore the ‘transaction costs’ of monitoring and 
enforcement, all these instruments are theoretically equivalent. But in reality, the 
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effectiveness of these policy instruments can vary greatly because the costs of 
monitoring and enforcement are not the same given differences in the organizational 
structures of countries. For instance, if polluters are relatively weak and can be 
effectively monitored and taxed, the tax solution may work better than a subsidy 
solution as the latter typically faces greater problems of financing and monitoring. But 
if polluting firms are powerful and can successfully obstruct monitoring and 
enforcement, a tax solution may fail to achieve much, and regulatory or subsidy 
solutions may work relatively better in that context. This is in general why policies 
that work in one country can often perform much less well or fail entirely in others. 
 
The dramatic success of industrial policies in East Asia largely reflected the 
ability of these countries to incrementally modify the design of their ambitious policy 
instruments in the light of experience. None of these countries began with a complete 
map of what needed to be done. Rather, trial and error resulted in the refinement of 
rent allocation conditions to achieve productivity-enhancing outcomes because these 
conditions proved to be implementable and provided greater and greater economic 
and political benefits to the top leadership. The emergence of effective conditions 
being imposed on broadly based industrial policy strategies reflected very specific 
political settlements in these countries, which were fairly untypical in the broader 
Asian context. The favourable configuration of holding power between the top 
political leadership, political groups, and factions at the intermediate levels of society 
and the emerging business sector allowed the evolution and enforcement of tough 
conditions on domestic firms receiving support (Khan, 2009; Khan and Blankenburg, 
2009). The financing provided to the chaebol through low interest loans, protected 
domestic markets, and export subsidies was increasingly made conditional on the 
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achievement of particular outcomes, for instance meeting export targets. These 
conditions ensured high levels of effort because the enforcement of the conditions 
proved to be credible. The state could not only withdraw subsidies from particular 
chaebol; it could also reallocate entire plants from one chaebol to another if 
performance was poor. Not surprisingly, the imposition of these conditions on the 
chaebol created strong compulsions on them to accelerate their productivity growth 
through the rapid learning of organizational skills and technical capabilities. 
 
Political settlements are effectively exogenous in the short term and cannot easily 
be changed through policy choices. The favourable political settlements in East Asia 
were clearly not the result of policy choices of the South Korean or Taiwanese states. 
Rather, these states inherited favourable configurations of relative power, which were 
outcomes of their histories and in particular of the social engineering carried out by 
the Japanese when they occupied these territories in the early part of the twentieth 
century. However, policy choices did play a role in East Asia. The choices of the East 
Asian state leaderships that mattered were the introduction of ambitious industrial 
policies, followed by their discovery that it was relatively easy to modify and refine 
the conditions associated with rent allocations to achieve productivity-enhancing 
outcomes. 
 
The South Asian countries also introduced ambitious industrial policies in the 
1950s but in the context of very different political settlements. In these conditions it 
proved to be virtually impossible for policy to evolve in the direction of imposing 
appropriate conditions on the rent-receiving firms. In the typical South Asian country 
power within the ruling coalition was much more fragmented, again because of long 
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historical processes including the nature of the colonial impact in these countries. As a 
result there were many powerful political organizations at the intermediate levels of 
society that were competing to capture rents, and these organizations could not always 
be overridden by the top leadership. When ambitious industrial policies began to 
create large rents for emerging business organizations, satisficing strategies for 
protecting rents could be easily implemented because there were many political 
organizations that could protect the rents of particular businesses in exchange for 
kickbacks. The result was that here policy could not plausibly evolve in the direction 
of imposing stricter conditions on rent-receiving firms or threaten to withdraw rents 
from non-performing firms (Khan, 2000b). 
 
The failure of policy to evolve in these obvious directions in South Asia cannot 
be explained by the ignorance of bureaucrats and politicians in these countries. This 
was not just an oversight. The political and bureaucratic elites in these countries were 
perfectly aware of the problem at a very early stage, but they also knew that policy 
evolution in the direction of greater effectiveness and the withdrawal of rents from 
non-performers would not be enforceable. As long ago as the mid-1960s, the Dutt 
Committee set up by the government of India recognized that the licensing regime 
that was directing rents to infant industries was primarily helping a small group of 
large firms who were capturing these rents on their own terms (Government of India, 
1969). But the politics of responding to this effectively was not simple. To the extent 
that responses were attempted, they were often blunt and counterproductive. Thus, in 
India, one response was Indira Gandhi’s Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act (MRTP) of 1969, which set asset limits on the holdings of large business houses 
that were thought to have unduly prospered under the licensing regime. The new act 
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was largely punitive, was not properly enforced and had little effect on actual levels 
of concentration. Significantly, it did not seek to address the problem of rent 
management to achieve better outcomes. The state did not try to set new conditions 
for achieving competitiveness by changing the broad contours of the policy, including 
the choice of supported sectors and firms, even though the necessity of such changes 
was explicitly recognized by the Dutt Committee. In other words, the failure to move 
in the direction of better rent management, at least in India in the 1960s, cannot be 
attributed to ignorance. However, there may have been missed opportunities of a more 
complex sort. The political settlement could not be easily changed but policies could 
have been radically redesigned to be more credible in this context. The problem was 
that a policy design that allocated significant learning rents ex ante to broadly defined 
sectors made it difficult to exclude large business houses from these rents. 
 
A general feature of the policies that both East Asian and South Asian countries 
were attempting in the 1960s and 1970s was that much of their rents for learning were 
allocated ex ante, before the firms in question had established their competitive 
organizational capabilities. These ex ante rents were also significant in their scope (in 
terms of the numbers of sectors and firms supported). Enforcing effective conditions 
on these financing instruments was clearly beyond the political capacity of the Indian 
state, and it did not even attempt to move in that direction. However, other financing 
instruments may have been more successful, and some insights into what may have 
worked became clearer with the experiences of the 1980s. A change in the design of 
the financing instrument could in principle ensure high levels of effort in learning 
even in countries where the political settlements precluded the enforcement of tough 
conditions on ex ante rent recipients. Monitoring requirements could be very different 
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if the rent was promised to the learning firm ex post, and delivered after success was 
established. The typical patent-based technology rent that creates incentives for 
innovation becomes available to successful innovators ex post. For rents allocated ex 
post, the public monitoring requirements are less demanding and the institutional 
requirement is mainly to determine the period of ex post rent protection, which 
primarily determines the magnitude of the prize allocated to successful innovators 
(Khan, 2000a). If rents are only available ex post, they can still help to make the 
financing of innovation or learning more viable, because innovators or firms engaged 
in learning can offer investors higher returns in the future, thereby getting access to 
longer periods of financing at a lower up-front cost. 
 
In contrast to Schumpeterian rents, learning rents are typically provided ex ante 
(for instance through tariffs on imports or the provision of low cost credit). 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, there are demanding monitoring and enforcement 
requirements with ex ante rents if high-effort learning is to be achieved. If instead, the 
policy instrument allocated some of the rent ex ante but reserved significant rents as a 
prize ex post, conditional on the achievement of competitive success, these conditions 
can help to self-select firms that believed they could make the learning jump as well 
as creating strong compulsions and incentives for high levels of effort in learning. 
This is because these firms would be initially investing in the learning itself, in 
anticipation of a prize ex post. In addition, if the ex post rents were sufficiently large 
and credible, firms engaged in learning could also raise financing on viable terms 
from investors in the same way as innovators aiming for innovation rents can raise 




In the 1980s a number of sectors in South Asian countries made significant 
progress in technology adoption and in developing organizational capabilities for 
competitive production by (serendipitously) adopting ex post rent allocation 
strategies. This period of rapid learning is often mistakenly attributed to 
‘liberalization’, even though it is widely recognized in the South Asian literature that 
liberalization did not happen in any significant way until a decade later. Given their 
political settlements, the enforcement conditions were now a lot better for these types 
of strategies, and the results achieved were correspondingly dramatic. Examples 
include the financing of learning in the Indian automobile and pharmaceutical 
industries and the Bangladeshi garments and textiles industry (Khan, 2009, 2013a, 
2013b). These examples differ significantly in the details of the financing strategies, 
but a brief look at the Indian automobile industry can provide a broad outline of the 
very different monitoring and enforcement requirements here. 
 
In the 1980s India’s automobile industry was transformed from a protected sector 
with limited global competitiveness to a globally competitive sector that made the 
country one of the leading global automobile exporters in a very short span of time. 
The transformation began with a partnership between a public sector enterprise and 
the Japanese company Suzuki, which participated in a joint venture agreement signed 
in 1982. Suzuki was effectively offered an ex post learning rent in the form of access 
to the protected Indian automobile market, which still had tariffs in the region of 85 
per cent. But to be able to sell in this protected market, Suzuki first had to make the 
Maruti-Suzuki car, which would have to have a high enough quality to carry the 
Suzuki name and reputation, and it would have to achieve a 60 per cent domestic 
content within five years. This combination of rewards and conditions meant Suzuki 
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had to make a significant investment in improving the organizational capabilities of 
an entire swathe of Indian Tier 1 and Tier 2 component producers to meet the 
domestic content target and yet produce a car that would be of a quality that could 
justify the Suzuki brand name. The design of the financing helped to address the 
contracting failure that would have otherwise constrained investment in learning. It 
provided Suzuki with significant additional incentives for financing the organizational 
learning of Indian producers. The significance of the policy design here was that 
Suzuki’s effort no longer had to be monitored by the Indian state, as strong incentives 
were created for Suzuki to monitor itself and its Tier 1 and 2 partners, simply because 
it was investing first. The recovery of this investment and of the additional rent 
required rapid success in building not only the organizational capabilities in its own 
plant but also in the plants of its supplier chain. The achievement of global 
organizational capabilities and competitiveness in Indian-owned Tier 1 and 2 
companies began in this way, and the Suzuki deal was replicated with other foreign 
automobile companies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The result was a rapid growth 
in the capabilities and competitiveness of these suppliers, which eventually allowed 
the development of a diversified Indian automobile industry producing globally 
competitive Indian-branded cars. 
 
Features of the political settlement in India are important for understanding the 
enforceability of the conditions associated with this industrial policy package. Suzuki 
as a Japanese company operating in India did not have the political links to 
renegotiate its contract if it failed to achieve the domestic content requirements that it 
had signed up to deliver. This was important for imposing credible compulsions on 
the company to achieve the domestic content agreed upon. The Indian Tier 1 and 2 
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companies that were getting assistance from Suzuki to build their organizational 
capabilities were not getting public funds, and these investments (which were 
effectively rents for learning for the supplier firms) could not be protected indefinitely 
through any rent-seeking activities of these firms. The only rational strategy for the 
supplier firms was to cooperate with Suzuki in a high-effort strategy to raise their 
competitiveness, as that was the only mechanism available for increasing their 
incomes over time. Thus, an examination of the terms and conditions of the financing 
strategy, keeping in mind the learning problem that had to be solved and the political 
context in which the conditions had to be enforced, shows that the unexpectedly rapid 
success that was achieved was not really surprising after all. While the other sectoral 
stories that we have referred to are different in detail, in every case these strategies 
offered part of the rent ex post and a combination of financing conditions that 
generated high effort in the learning process in the context of the political settlements 
of these countries. 
 
These examples provide important methodological insights, even though the 
substantive details of how learning was financed and the conditions that were 
effective are not replicable. Even in India, the precise mechanisms are no longer 
available because after India joined the WTO, levels of tariff protection became much 
lower on average and domestic content requirements can no longer be imposed on 
foreign investors. The point, however, is not about the precise mechanisms of funding 
and the conditions that were used, but the more general one about the sequence of 
financing, the allocation of rents, and the credibility or otherwise of the conditions 
required for high-effort learning given the political settlement. The financing methods 
and conditions that may be appropriate for financing organizational capability 
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development in British manufacturing are likely to be different from both the East 
Asian and South Asian examples. However, the examples of successful and less 
successful industrial policy strategies demonstrate the importance of thinking through 
the rent allocation conditions and the feasibility of their enforcement in the relevant 
political settlement. 
 
The policy discussion about industrial policy options for Britain could usefully 
look at some aspects of the Asian experience. The issues discussed here pointed to the 
importance of identifying the most important contracting failures that warrant 
industrial policy interventions. Surprising as it may seem, this is often not done, and 
all types of problems are sometimes jointly addressed with the same package of rents 
and conditions, which then achieves very little. The issue of organizational capability 
development is particularly important and is likely to be an important constraint for 
the UK. Addressing this problem requires very specific forms of assistance, with 
credible conditions that compel high levels of effort. We saw how instruments that 
were very similar to East Asian ones failed to create broad-based competitive sectors 
in South Asia but new types of financing instruments were more effective in the 
1980s. The ex post rents that were used are particularly interesting to examine in 
detail, though the precise instruments are likely to be radically different in an 
advanced country context. However, to be effective, policies aiming to develop the 
competitiveness of firms will in general have to satisfy the dual requirement of 
creating the opportunity for companies to engage in learning-by-doing as well as 
creating credible compulsions for high levels of effort in learning organizational 
capabilities. This requires thinking through mechanisms of financing organizational 
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learning and conditions attached to that financing that are credible in the context of 
the contemporary British political settlement. 
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